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Number 2

Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent:
The Shapers of West Virginia Law, Part II*
JOHN ElI**

"Railroad law" was a problem which West Virginia shared with
the rest of the nation. To bolster their arguments, Brannon and
Dent could turn to precedents in other jurisdictions, as Brannon did
when he attempted to do away with the doctrine of "superior
servant" or "vice principal" in the fellow servant rule. "Oil law"
was a different matter, however. The discovery and development
of the West Virginia oil fields during the years before spindletopbefore the great Texas and California finds-presented the Supreme
Court of Appeals with unique legal problems and give it what was
perhaps its one great opportunity to expound law in an entirely new
area. Brannon's biographer has staked out for him claim to the
lion's share of credit for this work. "New problems had to be
faced," he observed, "particularly those arising in regard to oilbearing properties, and his decisions on questions of leaseholds commanded the respect and approval of other jurisdictions wherein oil
development occurred at periods subsequent to its appearance in
West Virginia."5 There is no denying that Brannon rendered valuable service in defining the law covering oil leases.59 But so, too,
did Dent.6" At least he had enough interest in the problems involved
Part I of this paper was published in the December issue.
5**
7 Assistant

Professor of Law, New York University.

See note 25, supra.

58 KNorr, Henry Brannon, 2 DicnoN~AY op A.m.ERic

BioGRAPHY, 603,

604 5(1929).
9
Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S.E.
433 (1903); McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508
(1902);
60 Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S.E. 899 (1900).
Eclipse Oil Co. v. Garner, 53 W. Va. 151, 44 S.E. 131 (1903);
Lowther Oil Co. v. Gruffey, 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S.E. 101 (1902); Lawson v.
Akin, 48 W. Va. 348, 37 S.E. 596 (1900); Trees v. Eclipse Oil Co., 47 W. Va.
107, 34 S.E. 933 (1899); Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va.
84, 34 S.E. 923 (1899).
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not to leave their development solely in Brannon's hands. He filed
concurring opinions in a few of these cases,61 including some in
which Brannon had written unusually long majority decisions, 2 and
also dissented on occasion. 3 This shows he appreciated their significance, yet at the same time, his inherent distrust of some sections
of the business community prevented him from attributing to them
special importance. His approach was usually governed by an educated common sense, as in one dissent when he suggested that his
colleagues were giving too much weight to the fact that oil was
involved.
"In no other kind of a case except an oil case would this
Court for a moment entertain such a bill, but oil is so
lubricating that it sometimes causes the wheels of justice
to slip a cog, and if the guardians thereof are not on the
alert it may cause oleaginous construction of principles of
equity to 64produce more irreparable damage than it
prevents.
Judge Dent reviewed election cases much the same way. He
magnanimously admitted that, along with "railroad jurisprudence"
and "oleaginous construction" in oil matters, election cases were
potentially too fulminant for his colleagues-his all-too-human colleagues-to deal with objectively. He and Brannon, belonging to
opposite political parties, almost always disagreed in election decisions, with Brannon usually writing for the majority.6" In Morris v.
Board of Canvassers, Brannon rejected an application for a writ of
mandamus filed by the Democratic candidate for recorder of Charleston. 66 Dent attributed this "departure from the fundamental prin61 Henne v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 192, 206, 43 S.E. 147, 153
(1902) (concurring opinion); Harris v. Cobb, 49 W. Va. 350, 358, 38 S.E.
559, 562 (1901) (concurring opinion; Brannon dissenting).
62 State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 107, 24 S.E. 688, 698
(1895) (concurring opinion).
63 Williams v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 181, 191, 43 S.E. 214,
(dissenting opinion).
218 (1902)
64
Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 227, 44 S.E. 533, 541 (1903)
(dissenting opinion).
65 Exception: Kirkpatrick v. Deegans, 53 W. Va. 275, 44 S.E. 465 (1903)
(Dent66 concurred; Brannon dissented).
The election complained of occurred just a few months after the
Democrats suffered disaster in November, 1900. Brannon was reelected and
another Republican, Poffenbarger, replaced English, a fact to which Dent
may have been referring when he wrote in his dissent: "Having much against
my will been reduced to the position of dissenting member of the Court,
I would like to dissent oftener than I do, were it not for waste of time
that can be more profitably used, the pressure of other duties and the fear
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ciples of justice" to "the peculiar exegencies of this litigation."67
Speaking directly to Brannon he wrote:
"Such bias arises from the frailty of human nature.

From it no one is entirely free although sometimes the unconscious victim thereof may deceive himself into the

belief of absolute freedom therefrom. It affects the moral
conscience and renders it weak and vascillating when it
should be strong and stable. The person who is the slave
thereof deserves our pity as well as condemnation for a

fellow feeling or rather failing should make us wonderous
kind.
It is this bias that murdered Socrates in the name of
the State for the protection of youth, betrayed mocked, and
crucified Christ for the preservation of Israel, and established and sustained the Spanish inquisition, that pure and
undefiled religion might be maintained on the earth."68
Strong words, perhaps, especially since Dent was as partisan a
Democrat as Brannon was a Republican.69 But, election cases being
what they are, they have little interest or importance today, save
of being too captious and critical. Therefore I studiously avoid doing so.
But sometimes the couclusions [sic] of my worthy associates are so palpably
wrong, their construction of law so subversive of truth and right, their reasoning so unsound and fallacious, that it would require a much more stocial [sic]
disposition than mine to remain silent under the torture inflicted by their
departure from the fundamental principles of justice." Morris v. Board of
Canvassers of City of City of Charleston, 49 W. Va. 251, 265, 38 S.E. 500,
506 67
(1901) (dissenting opinion).
Ibid.
68
1Ibid. In Daniel v. Simms, 49 W. Va. 554, 581, 39 S.E. 690, 701
(dissenting opinion), Dent suggested that in election cases "ordinary courts
cannot be expected to arise to such sublime heights of justice. To do so is
to count political martyrdom at the hands of political associates." By 1904
he, himself, was apparently ready to count martyrdom for he concurred in
an opinion upholding the election of a Republican. Doll v. Bender, 55 W. Va.
404, 47 S.E. 293 (1904). Interestingly enough, his prediction proved correct.
He never received another chance to abandon his party. By the time the
next election appeal came up, he had been defeated for reelection. In Stafford v. Board of Canvassers, 56 W. Va. 670, 675, 49 S.E. 588 (1904) he
noted as "the last act of my judicial career" that "Political prejudice or bias,
I am aware, is not objection to a judge, yet it has been the prolific source
of injustice and wrong, and even cruelty, from time immemorial and always
will be until the people adopt some way of selecting their judicial officers
independent of their party affiliations. . .
69For their most interesting election case see Payne v. Staunton, 55
W. Va. 202, 46 S.E. 927 (1904) (Brannon for the Court; Dent dissenting).
Brannon ruled that a clerk has such interest as entitled him to refuse an
inspection of records in his office by private citizens when such inspection
is not called for by law.
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for the light which they shed on the personalities, attitudes, and
rivalries of the men who made West Virginia law.
Another problem which sheds light on the contrasting outlooks
of Brannon and Dent, and which was also somewhat peculiar to
their times, was murder. The home of the vendetta and the Red
Men was badly plagued by a rash of homicides and some lawyers
even thought that the very basis of society was endangered."0 The
Supreme Court of Appeals reacted strongly to the situation, Brannon to a greater extent than Dent.' Although he was willing to
construe strictly special statutes, such as the "Red Men's Act," 2
Brannon was very reluctant to disturb murder convictions obtained
under traditional common law definitions,"3 and usually could be
counted upon to uphold a jury verdict of guilty. 4 While he freely
70
Addressing the Bar Association in 1887, former United States Senator
Waitman Willey linked the Red Men with every peril from unionism to
anarchism: "For every week, aye, every week, the mob, in some section or
another, is commiting the gravest acts of violence-whipping, shooting, and
murdering American citizens-wresting persons accused of crime from the
custody of the law, and executing them without process or authority of law,
and these outrages are multiplying with fearsome frequency. The catalogue
of banditti engaged in this lawless violence, begins to tap the memory:
"Regulators," "Red-men," "Mollie McGuires," "Bald Knobbers," "Ku Klux,"
"Boycotters" and all the forms of intimidation and violence which the barbarous spirit of "be boycot" [sic] inspires. And yonder at your industrial
and commercial centers, are the secret conclaves of socialism, agrarianism
and anarchism, conspiring for the subversion of our American institutions,
ready with bombshell and torch and dynamite to destroy property and life,
and whatever hinders their revolutionary purposes." Willey, Law and Lawyers - Their Relation to a Republican Form of Government, PRoc. oF 1887.
ANNuAL MEEnTNG WEST VA. BAR ASSN. 114, 118 (1887).
7 Dent's approach to criminal cases was shaped, to a great degree, by
his religious fundamentalism. State v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S.E. 99
(1901). He gave talionic support to capital punishment. ("Life for life is its [the
law's] demand, not alone that it may be vindicated and the criminal punished,
but for the protection of society and a warning to others suffering from a
like depravity"). State v. Kohne, 48 W. Va. 335, 37 S.E. 553 (1900). Brannon's attitude was based more on the danger-to-society argument than on
religious grounds. Being less puritanical than Dent, he was willing to give
mountain men a benefit of the doubt in cases of lewd and lascivious cohabitation he might not have accorded in murder cases. See, State v. Miller,
42 W. Va. 215, 24 S.E. 882 (1896).
72State v. Flaherty, 42 W. Va. 240, 24 S.E. 885 (1896)
(Brannon
reversed because motion for change of venue should have been granted
since an impartial jury was unobtainable in county); State v. Bingham, 42
W. Va. 234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896) (Brannon reversed because lower court
when it instructed jury that it was immaterial who was the first aggressor,
the conspirators or the injured party.).
71 State v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65, 79, 30 S.E. 209 (1898) (dissenting
opinion
74 by Brannon).
For examples of Brannon upholding murder convictions during a
single calendar year see State v. Hager, 50 W. Va. 370, 40 S.E. 393 (1901);
State v. Williams, 49 W. Va. 220, 38 S.E. 495 (1901); State v. Mooney,
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disagreed with the findings of juries in railroad cases, and occasionally restated the facts to satisfy his own interpretation, he protested
whenever his brethern did this to the benefit of defendants in
criminal cases.7 Dent was more consistent. He usually opposed
any invasion of the jury's function by the Supreme Court of Appeals
in either civil or criminal cases. 76 And he was far more willing than
Brannon or the other members of the Court to grant new trials
for errors or technicalities, large or small. 77 He did not dissent in
State v. Mooney when Brannon upheld a murder conviction even
though the prosecutor had warned the jury, "Turn him loose and
he'll kill someone else." 8 But he filed a memorable dissent in
State v. Shawn 9 --a somewhat similar situation. The defendant had

been convicted of an unusually brutal murder, having deliberately
shot the husband of his wife's sister while she was pleading for his
life. In the course of the trial the prosecutor had made three remarks
before the jury to which the defense objected:
"'If you sentence the prisoner to the penitentiary for life,
it won't be five years till he will be let out on some excuse
or pretext, and return home to enter on a new course of
crime.' 'This is the grand culmination an epidemic of
crimes that have been committed in this [Hampshire]
county.' 'He is so steeped in crime that he has no friend
to sit beside him during the trial.' "8o

Neither Brannon nor Dent doubted that Shawn was guilty. It was
just that Dent was disturbed about the prejudicial effects which
these remarks may have made on his chances to have received a
49 W. Va. 712, 39 S.E. 657 (1901); State v. Madison, 49 W. Va. 96, 38
S.E. 492 (1901). For a criminal case (abetting the theft of a horse) in which
he dissents from a reversal of the conviction that same year see State v.
Ellison, 49 W. Va. 70, 38 S.E. 574 (1901). For a conviction of first degree
murder with death penalty which he reverses see State v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va.
718, 22 S.E. 310 (1895).
7-In one case he concurred in the reversal of a conviction for rape,
but tried to narrow the opinion by objecting to the Court's passing on the
credibility of state witnesses. State v. Hull, 45 W. Va. 767, 778, 32 S.E.
240 76
(1899) (concurring opinion).
See his note concurring with Brannon,. id.at 779," 32 S.E. at 245.
But see also his opinion in State v. Kerns, 47 W. Va. 266, 34 S.E. -734 (1899).
In a concurring opinion Brannon felt called upon to remark; "I intimate no
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id., at 272, 32 S.E.
at 245 (concurring opinion).
77 See State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 472, 41 S.E. 204 (1902) (dissenting opinion).
70 State v. Mooney, 49 W. Va. 712, 39 S.E. 657 (1901).
79
40 W. Va. 1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894).
80
1d. at 12-13, 20 S.E. at 877 (dissenting opinion).
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verdict of life imprisonment rather than the death sentence which
he got, while Brannon was disturbed about the consequences of failing to bring him to a swift and well-deserved final punishment.
"There is no evidence before the jury," Dent wrote, "to justify
any of these expressions. From them the jury might infer-and
for this purpose they were evidently uttered-that the accused was
guilty of many crimes, and this was the grand culmination of his
wicked career, and that, if sent to the penitentiary, he would be
back in five years to repeat these crimes." 8'
"For myself," Brannon answered, "I can not say the remarks
of Counsel now in hand were legally condemnable." 82
"What language," Dent asked, "could be stronger or more
reprehensible? It was used for no other purpose than to arouse
human passion, and prejudice the prisoner in the minds of the jury,
converting them into an unreasonable mob, with vengeance in their
hearts, rather than a calm deliberate tribunal of his fellow-men,
cooly reaching the8 unbiased
verdict to which the law and evidence
3
point.
unenvingly
"[T]he case made by the evidence," Brannon said, "was so
strong against the accused that his counsel conceded before the
jury that he was guilty of murder in the second degree, and virtually
conceded it in the first degree, and only asked a verdict for a
life term in the penitentiary, rather than death, and the evidence
abundantly sustains the finding of murder in the first degree."8 4
"Granting," Dent replied, "that the prisoner was guilty of
murder in the first degree-which I do not pretend to disputethe law, in tender consideration of human frailities, seeks to distinguish between the different degrees of depravity entering into
each particular commission of the highest of crimes, and, in doing
so, weights the motives that led to the criminal act."8 "
Brannon did not think that this had much to do with the
words objected to: "They could only bear on the mode of punishment, and we see that death is not an undue punishment for the
deed, and the jury was vested with absolute discretion to impose
81 Ibid.
82
8

3

84

85

Id. at 8, 20 S.E. at 875.

Id.

at 13, 20 S.E. at 877 (dissenting opinion).

1d. at 10, 20 S.E. at 876.

Id. at 13, 20 S.E. at 877 (dissenting opinion).
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it or not. This being so, ought we to set aside a verdict plainly
right under the evidence, merely for these remarks?" 6
"It is better," Dent concluded, "that the guilty escape than
any should be unjustly punished. And no man who is not totally
depraved should be denied the opportunity which imprisonment
for life affords him of repenting his crimes, redeeming his life, and
making preparation to stand before the bar of that all-wise Judge,
from whom no secret thing can be hidden, and who will condemn
our disobedience to His statutes according to the standards we have
created for our fellow men. May He have mercy on the soul of
Daniel D. Shawn when it is ushered into His presence in obedience
to the final judgment of this Court.""7
Oil cases, election cases, and murder cases all posed problems
which everyone agreed were serious. The seriousness of the problem
of married women, however, was something which Dent invented
almost singlehanded. Admittedly it would have been troublesome
even if he had not been there to add fuel to the flames, 8 but he
was there-actively and passionately championing womankind and
motherhood and shedding judicial tears over the legal gait to which
truculent men made their females prance. 9 When he contemplated
the laws which "brutal man" had raised up to enslave "the mother
sex," Dent felt he understood why Madame De Stael once said
"with biting, yet truthful sarcasm, that the more she saw of men,
the more she admired dogs!"9 His was a zeal which Henry Brannon
did not and could not share. And since Brannon was unwilling to
sit silently by while Dent attacked time-honored doctrines of the
common law, they often disagreed in these cases.9" The most interesting is Schamp v. Security Sav. & Loan Assn. because it throws as
86

1d at 10-11, 20 S.E. at 876.
Id. at 14-15, 20 S.E. at 877-78 (dissenting opinion).
88 In 1897, the President of the West Virginia Bar Association told the
annual meeting: "A Bar Association meeting would be considered anything
but a success at which no speech was made, address delivered, paper read or
resolution offered, touching on the vexed question of the laws relating to
married women." Crogan, President's Address, 12 PRoc. W. VA. BAR AssN.
23, 33
8 9 (1897).
See Board of Education v. Mitchell, 40 W. Va. 431, 434, 21 S.E. 1017
(1895);
Good v. Good. 39 W. Va. 357, 360-62 (1894).
90
Ball v. Stewart, 41 W. Va. 654, 655, 24 S.E. 632 (1896).
91 See, Harvey v. Curry, 47 W. Va. 800, 35 S.E. 838 (1900) (Dent for
Court; Brannon dissenting); Dickel v. Smith, 38 W. Va. 635, 18 S.E. 721
(1893) (Dent for Court: Brannon dissenting); Dent's belief in the basic
goodness of women may explain why he interpreted in a different light facts
which Brannon suggested showed that a woman had been mixed up in a
fraud. Vandervort v. Fouse, 52 W. Va. 214, 219, 43 S.E. 112 (1902) (con87
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much light on how Brannon and Dent interpreted statutes as on how
they felt about the rights of married women and also because it has
an ironic twist. Dent, the champion of women, is, in this case,
due to his antipathy towards so-called "married-women law," arguing against a woman who seeks to shield herself behind a special
statute designed to protect her by restricting her power to pledge
her separate real property to secure a loan. The more traditionbound Brannon thought the pledge-deed clearly void, and voted
to uphold the lower court's decree cancelling it. He probably considered Dent's talk about these statutes making woman the "slave
of man" pure nonsense. In any event, he felt it had nothing to do
with the solution of the case.
"The construction of this statute, as I see it," he said, speaking
for the Court, "is that a married woman is totally prohibited from
charging her estate with any debt except in the cases specified in
the statute. These cases are excptions out of the disability created for
her by the statute. For you will observe that the statute says that
she may charge her estate 'in the following cases, in the following
manner, and to the following extent, and not otherwise.' ,92
"A married woman," Dent replied, "is forbidden in this section
to borrow money to enhance her separate estate if she wishes to
do so, and execute a deed of trust on such estate to secure the
same, and, after she has it, there is no law forbidding her to do
what she pleases with it, any more than if she were a feme sole.
She can give it to her husband, pay his debts with it, or bum it up.
'
It is her separate property, absolutely at her disposal."93
"It cannot be said," Brannon wrote, "that this loan is valid because used in acquiring personal estate. A debt may be created in
the very act of acquiring personal or real estate, but there can be no
borrowing for the purpose of acquiring personality, or to pay a debt
existing for its prior purchase, for the power to borrow is limited
to the purposes of paying purchase money on realty or for improvement on it. No other borrowing is legitimate under the statute.
This was purely a loan. The law can look at it in no other light."9 '
curring note by Dent, Jr.) As Dent approached the end of his judicial career
he grew wiser and sadder. The day of revelations arrived when he finally
had to admit that "man, poor man, is not wholly to blame." State v. Jones,
53 W. Va. 613, 45 S.E. 916 (1903). See also, Brown v. Nutter, 54 W. Va.
82, 85,
92 46 S.E. 375 (1903).
Schamp v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 44 W. Va. 47, 48, 28 S.E.
709 93
(1897).
1d. at 51-52, 28 S.E. at 711 (dissenting opinion).
94
1d. at 49, 28 S.E. at 710.
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"The Court," said Dent, "is probably misled by the language
used under the second head, but by transposing the same, according
to the plain intention of the legislature, it will read: 'A debt created
for money borrowed by her for the full payment of the purchase
money of her separate real property, or for the payment of such
buildings and improvements thereon',--not referring to a present
borrowing, but to a past borrowing, for which a present debt
exists." g
The two judges now began to get a bit peeved at one another.
Brannon: "I cannot agree with the view of Judge Dent that only
pre-existing debts, and not fresh loans, come under the ban of this
statute. He suggests the only ground to sustain this deed, but I
respectfully say that it is not tenable."96
Dent: "The opinion of the majority of the Court renders the
statute contradictory and inconsistent, not to say foolish and senseless.""'
From this low point they quickly rose to the broad plateau of
principle and policy.
Brannon: "This statute was made to defend a married woman's
separate property against her own improvidence, want of business
capacity, and importunity and duress by her husband. And we all
know that there is more danger of loss of a married woman's estate
from new loans than from old debts. She is not very likely to charge
her property with previous debts, but we will all know how likely
she is to do so under the stress and pinch of present need of herself or her husband. There was really much more need to defend
her against poverty and ruin from loss of her separate estate from
new loans, than from antecedent debts. ....
Dent: "[T]he claim is that she dare not, even with the consent
of her husband, pledge, pawn, or mortgage her property to any
extent or amount, unless she makes known to the 'lords of creation'
for what special purpose she is about to use it, and that must be
as designated in section 12. What a turning back of the dials of
time, and resurrecting barbarous and heathen customs, when woman
was regarded as the mere irresponsible slave of man! Not only this,
95
96 1d. at 51,
Id.at 50,
97
Id.at 52,
98

28 S.E. at 711 (dissenting opinion).
28 S.E. at 710.
28 S.E. at 711 (dissenting opinion).
Id.at 50, 28 S.E. at 710.
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but the law is made to out-Herod Herod, for not only is she to be
protected against herself, but also against her husband. In short
she is reduced to the condition of being the mere ward of the law."99
On only one other topic did Marmaduke Dent feel so passionally as on the rights of married women-the topic of God.
"He was," wrote Governor Atkinson, "invariably found on the
moral side of every question which arose in civic matters.""' This
was an understatement. He was not only found on the moral side,
he defined it, expounded it, and sometimes even invented it, as,
for example, when he dissented in one case from an opinion written
by Brannon and suggested that the first canon of judicial construction
made agreements subservient "To the supreme will of God, expressed
through the dictates of conscience and known as the moral law. '" '
This was a rather sophisticated notion, even for West Virginia, and it
is doubtful if many people followed his reasoning. Yet, on most of
these occasions, he was probably reflecting the prevailing attitudes
of his jurisdiction which sat solidly astride the Great American Bible
Belt during those confident, comfortable days at the turn of the
century. Many, perhaps a majority, of his fellow citizens expected
their judges to stand up and be counted on every issue involving God,
evil, and the flesh. As students of textualism they could appreciate
his frustration at the inability of mere man to apply talionic justice. 2
And few quarreled when he affirmed his belief in the supremacy
of natural law 3 or when he expressed the thoughts that King
Alfred had written the Ten Commandments into the Saxon Codes
and that the Bible was part and parcel of English common law.' 4
Few, that is, except Henry Brannon. When Dent cited the Book of
99
1d.
00

at 53, 28 S.E. at 711 (dissenting opinion).
AI~lNsON, BENCH AND BAR OF WEST Vmowm 74 (1919).
'0' Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 51 W. Va. 106, 117, 121 (1902) (dissenting

opinion).
0
1 2 Boggess v. Richard's Adm'n, 39 W. Va. 567, 577, 20 S.E. 299 (1894):
"The maxim of the moral law is tooth for tooth, eye for eye, reputation
for reputation, property for property, and life for life, or what is called,
'restitution in kind.' Human ingenuity and wisdom could not devise a
practical plan for carrying out this maxim without the infliction of the
greatest cruelties, and often times the greatest injustice. So, leaving the
equality which this law demands to the final arbitrament of Him who can
weigh the motives and intentions, and from whom no secret is hidden, and
on whom no deception can be successfully practice, the common-law . . .
provides a pecuniary reparation. .. ."
103 Thompson v. Cox, 42 W. Va. 566, 568, 26 S.E. 189 (1896): "The
laws of man can make or destroy rights, but cannot change the laws of
morality, for they have been placed beyond their search or control by a
Supreme Legislator."
104 Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S.E. 274 (1899).
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Exodus as authority for awarding exemplary damages' 5 and overturned the long-standing West Virginia rule against them on the
grounds that the common law is not agnostic, atheistic, or deistic,
but Christian,' 6 Brannon protested:
Judge Holt, English and myself, lest we be misunderstood, conclude that a short note, to express our position, is
called for in view of the opinion in this case. In consultation
we suggested that we did not feel called upon, in a judicial
opinion, to assert or deny any particular, distinctive Christian creed or dogma... While we, as individuals, have the
highest regard and respect for Christianity generally, we do
not think it proper, in an opinion of this court, to appear
to espouse or enforce any particular or distinctive Christian
7
creed.' 0
Brannon's manner is that of a parent scolding a sheltered child.
He occasionally adopted this tone when dealing with Dent who
could be very exasperating at times. After all, not only did Dent
have the annoying habit of coming up with such crotchety citations
as Exodus, completely oblivious to his colleagues' obtestations, but
he had by far the sharpest tongue on the Court and seldom hesitated
to express himself openly and to the point. The animadversions
he directed against Brannon could be especially biting. He would
describe Brannon's opinions in such uncharitable terms as "foolish,"
"senseless," "unreasonable," "contradictory," "inconsistent," and
even "unjust."'0 ° "I cannot concur in the conclusion in this case,"
he wrote of a Brannon decision, "because it is unreasonable and
productive of gross injustice.' °9 And in one concurring opinion, he
inferred that pride kept Brannon from agreeing with him, by concluding with the challenge:
"Let the poet resume his pen
And prove himself the best of men.""'
Nor was Dent a man to be awed by the weight of numbers. At a
,o5 See Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895).
106 Ibid.

107
0 8

' 09

Ibid.
See text at note 97, supra.
Masby v. Lanark Co., 55 W. Va. 484, 487, 47 S.E. 358 (1904)

(dissenting opinion). See also Findley v. Cunningham, 53 W. Va. 1, 34, 44

S.E. 472
0 (1903).

" Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Val. R.R., 45 W. Va. 567, 577, 32
S.E. 234 (1898) (note by Dent, J.).
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time when his three colleagues on the four-man bench were Judges
McWhorter, Brannon, and English, he wrote:
I concur in the conclusion in this case, but not with
that portion of Judge McWhorter's opinion which tends
to abrogate the common law disability of husband and
wife to enter into valid legal contracts with each other
during coverture. He unwittingly falls into the same error
inadvertently committed by Judge Brannon, in the case of
Bank v. Atkinson, 32 W. Va. 203, (9 S.E. 175), and
following Judge English, in Miller v. Cox, 38 W. Va. 747,
(18 S.E. 960)." ' 11
There were times when Brannon's efforts to get Dent to conform to the majority's standards, and Dent's tart refusals to do so,
led to rather unjudicial backbench procacity. After looking over
the docket of Hartigan v. Board of Regents of West Virginia University, an action in which a dismissed college professor was seeking
reinstatement, Brannon decided that Dent should remove himself
from the case. It was the leading cause celebre of turn-of-the-century
West Virginia; probably the bitterest of the noisey, titillating jangles
which periodically errupted between the University's imported, shortlived, sometimes puritanic presidents and their native, insubordinate,
dissention-ridden faculties. The Dent family was involved in the
squabble. Not only was Judge Dent, the University's first graduate,
emotionally committed to the old faculty,' 12 but his brother was
of counsel for the plaintiff and his son-in-law, former ActingPresident Robert Allen Armstrong, although not a party, had been
dismissed along with Hartigan and stood to benefit should the
Court order reinstatement. Judge Dent reacted strongly to the exhortation that he not participate. When Brannon wrote an opinion
denying the power of the Court to interfere with a decision of the
Board of Regents, Dent filed a dissent in which he not only put
the suggestion on public record but used it to fling back at his
colleagues the slur of partisanship.
"The charge has been made that I am moved by
prejudice or through interest in the result of this case. The
best evidence of prejudice or undue interest is the evasion
IIMynes v. Mynes, 47 W. Va. 681, 697, 33 S.E. 935 (1900) (concurring
opinion).
See also note 66, supra.
1
2Hartigan v. Board of Regents of West Virginia University, 49 W. Va.
14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901) (dissenting opinion).
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or departure from the fundamental principles of law and
justice as settled by the decisions of the court and preserved
by the text writers. A man's heart must be known by his
works. In this opinion I have endeavored to adhere strictly
to the fundamental principles of justice as settled and
determined by the decided weight and preponderance of
authority and have not attempted in any manner to evade,
confuse or misinterpret the many decisions in relation to
these principles. From the chaff that has accumulated
from the careless work of incompetent and partisan
judges
13
I have sought to secure the true grains of wheat."
Perhaps the most remarkable result of Dent's refusal to disassociate himself from the case was that his colleagues decided to
disassociate the case from him. They did not admit him to their
conferences and, after the opinion was written, Brannon would not
let him see it. This rather unjudicial treatment was a bit too
much for the querulous, garrulous Dent to suffer in silent and it,
also, he put on public record in his dissent:
'For reasons known only to themselves my associates
denied me knowledge and inspection of their opinion and
syllabus until after it was handed down or became public
property. This is a matter of judicial courtesy or ethics,
and as a learned judge once said that courtesy is a mere
matter of taste about which there is no disputing and from
which there is no appeal since duelling has been abolished,
every judge has a right to treat his conferers as he sees
proper according to his inward consciousness and outward
experience. Not having been admitted to their exclusive
consultations over, nor been made aware of their written
conclusions until after given to the public, I deem it my
duty to review these conclusions, as some of them appeear
[sic] to me to be plainly violative of the true principles
of law and justice, and the opinion as a whole to be
evasive, inconclusive and unsatisfactory as an exposition of
sound law, although an admirable paper for other purposes.
It asserts that the University belongs to the executive department of the state government with which the courts
have no right to interfere; that a professor is not an of113 Ibid.
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ficer, and therefore has no rights under constitutional or
statutory law which the courts may protect, and, if an officer, that there are many decisions which hold that officers
may be removed without notice or hearing. These decisions
are then quoted and commented on as authority, although
they have been rejected long since by the best authorities,
both courts and text-writers, including this Court. . .

'

Now a judge willing to parade judicial bickerings in public
and chide his colleagues in official opinions was not likely to spare
either the lower courts ' or the bar." 6 It was inevitable that Dent,
who seemed unable or unwilling to repress his feelings or to curb
his words, would eventually give offense either to litigants or counsel.
They, unlike his fellow judges, could not attempt to silent him
by excluding him from the conference chamber or answer him by
filing dissenting or concurring opinions. The most any of them
would do was complain privately-any of them, that is, except a
Brannon. When, in Holt v. King,"'7 Dent directed an obloquy against
Judge Brannon's nephew, William W. Brannon, a leader of the
Weston County Bar, and suggested he was guilty of "the many
imputations of collusion apparently justified by the facts and circumstances of this case," Brannon did not accept it sitting down.
He went before the Bar Association and, complaining that Dent
had reflected "most seriously and severely upon my honesty and
integrity," asked that the Committee on Grievances be instructed
to "Study the whole case carefully, investigate the whole subject
and report the facts and circumstances to this Association, together
8
with such recommendations as may seem proper in the premises.""
With very little discussion, the Association approved the investigation and a year later, while Brannon himself was President, the
Committee reported that it had found him completely innocent of
any wrong-doing. Although it expressed regret "that the Judge
114 Ibid.

Reversing a murder conviction, Dent once asserted that the trial
judge had "misapprehended, misconstrued, and misapplied the law, and thus
misled the jury." State v. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 259, 24 S.E. 996 (1896).
116 In one opinion Dent remarked:
"This case appears to be one of dry
technicalities indicative of the want of meritorious defense." Thompson v.
Newlin, 51 W. Va. 346, 347, 41 S.E. 178 (1902). In an election case he
expressed confidence that the patriotism of the people will see to it that
"the evil prognostications of contestant's counsel with prove groundless."
Dail v.7 Hollandsworth, 39 W. Va. 1, 6, 19 S.E. 557 (1894).
"1 Holt v. King, 54 W. Va. 441, 47 S.E. 362 (1903).
"'Minutes of the 1903 Meeting, 19 PROC. W. VA. BAR AssN. 61-64
(1904).
"5
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used certain of the language found in the opinion," the Committee
refused to criticize Dent. "A proper respect for the highest State
Court forbids."
"We have no idea Judge Dent meant to do Mr. Brannon any injustice, and we have no thought that Mr. Brannon intended or was guilty of any corrupt practices. We
therefore recommend the following:
Resolved, that this Association regards Mr. W. W.
Brannon a member of the Association, a citizen of high
standing and worth, and a lawyer of integrity and ability
19
and worthy of the public confidence.'
The moderate tone and inconclusive fence-straddling of the report
may have led some to regard the whole affair as much ado about
nothing. But the tone was expected; what else could the Committee
say7 That the Bar Association had sponsored the investigation in
the first place was what discommoded Dent and brought him to
what must be regarded the low point of his judicial career. Furthermore, it may be doubted if he overlooked the fact that the resolution had been offered by a Brannon, who was a railroad lawyer,
during 1903, a year in which he, Dent, was fighting against heavy
odds, an election, which he lost.
While the incident is of importance to the biographer of Marinaduke Dent, its chief value to the historian of West Virginia law
is that it delineates, in unmistakable terms, the low esteem in which
the bar and the public held the Supreme Court of Appeals. The
Court suffered from disrespect, neglect, and even outright abuse.
The very year Dent went on the bench it had been attacked in a
twenty-six page, anonymous pamphlet which criticized twelve recent
opinions, three of them by Brannon."' What makes this the lowest
ebb of the Court's prestige is not so much the pamphlet itself as
reaction to it. The attitude of the Bar Association showed that
119

(1905).

Minutes of the 1904 Meeting, 20 PRoc. W. VA. BAR ASsN. 71-75

120 One of these was Hull v. Hull, 35 W. Va. 155, 13 S.E. 49 (1891),
in which Brannon held that a covenant of warranty applies to, the estate
conveyed, and cannot enlarge the estate. Of this the anonymous writer said:
"Now is not this just simply and altogether amazing? And if it were not in
print, to be read and known of all men, would it not be absolutely incredible
that any judge, at least in our State, could announce such doctrine? In the
paucity of words, in the poverty of language, we can only exclaim with
Dominie Sampson-Prodigious! Prodigious!" quoted in Minutes of the Meeting, 6 PROc. W. VA. BAR ASSN. 45 (1892).
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lawyers were by no means inclined to rush to the judges' defense.
Although they all deplored the pamphlet's tone, few were willing
to defend the Court and most preferred to use it as an excuse
for putting on record their dissatisfaction with the judiciary.12 1 They
rejected a resolution which called upon them to treat the court with
' and in its place passed another
respect 22
mildly rebuking the pamphleteer for his anonymous character and intemperate language. 23
It may be doubted if anyone in the state was surprised by this. 24
Disparaging the courts was an old West Virginia custom. Lawyers
had a long list of gripes, among which were complaints that judges
seldom held conferences before writing opinions125 and that some
decisions were the result of "log-rolling;"' 26 that the Court took
too much time rendering decisions,' 7 yet failed to give advocates
121 Id. at 17-22.
22
1 The resolution read in part: "Courts and judicial officers in the
rightful exercise of their functions should always receive the support and
countenance of attorneys against unjust criticism and popular clamor; and
it is an attorney's duty to give them his moral support in all proper ways,
and particularly by setting a good example in his own person of obedience
to law." Id. at 73. Ten years later the Bar Association did adopt a code
of ethics containing similar provisions. 17 PRoc. WEST VA. BAR AssN. 57
(1902).
123 "Resolved, that this Association while not passing upon the justice
or merits of the criticism on the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court,
contained in the anonymous pamphlet recently circulated throughout the
State, does not approve either the anonymous character of the pamphlet
or the intemperate language used therein." Minutes of the Meeting, 6 PROC.
W. VA. BAR ASSN. 87 (1892).
124 Nor did anyone miss the implication of the Bar Association's action.
Just before the resolution in the last footnote was passed, 0. Johnson, a
former Judge in the Supreme Court of Appeals, told the members of the
Association: "I do not think you ought to have brought the Court in
here and slaughtered it in this way." Id. at 86.
125 The evidence seems to indicate that they often failed to hold consultations. See discussion Minutes of the Meeting, 19 Pxoc. W. VA. BAR AssN.
65-66 (1904). It was not until 1903 that the Supreme Court adopted the
policy of holding preliminary conferences on every case in advance of opinion
and thus ended the "possibility of a one judge decision in the court of last
resort.' AT'rxsoN, BENCH AND BAR OF WEST VIRGINIA 146 (1919).
126The anonymous pamphlet charged that the decisions of the Supreme
Court were arrived at through log rolling. By an agreement among the
judges, one of them took all the books and papers in a case and would
later return with an opinion in which they would all concur. Minutes of the
Meeting, 6 PRoc. W. VA. BAR AssN. 84 (1892).
12 7
In 1903 it was alleged that a lawyer, in an out laying district, would
h-ve to read the newspapers carefully to see how his case had been decided.
If he saw that he had lost and he wanted to learn why, he would have to
write to the Clerk of Court, or to some lawyer in Charleston to discover
the court's reasons. Minutes of the Meeting, 19 PRoc. W. VA. BAR ASSN.
80 (1904).
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enough time to argue their cases; 28 and that delays of justice were
the judge's fault' 2 9 -one more reason why he and his judgments
were not accorded the respect of former days.' 30 In fact, whenever
a West Virginia lawyer had a good word for the judiciary, it usually
turned out to be a backhanded compliment, as when the President
of the Bar Association remarked in 1902: "The judges are usually
better lawyers than the rest of us; they should be. They have so

many good lawyers to teach them." 3 '
Though few were ready to come to the defense of the judges,
there were none who denied that they labored under rather trying
circumstances. The handicaps were many and well-known. They
included the fact that the judiciary system had been designed for
another era and a different economy;' 32 that, functioning in a new
128 In about 1900 the Supreme Court reduced the time permitted for
oral arguments from three hours (appellant) and two hours (appellee) to
one hour and a half (appellant) and one hour (appellee). Long-winded West
Virginia lawyers thought this was asking the impossible. As one expressed it:
"It is hardly conceivable that counsel can separate, point out to the Court,
and argue the questions arising in cases with any degree of satisfaction to
themselves or in such a manner as to properly aid the Court in the disposition of cases, within the time allowed them." Mollohan, The Association,
Its Work, Past and Prospective, 16 PRoc. W. VA. BA, ASSN. 22, 28 (1901).
The bar succeeded in having the reduction rescinded. See ATmNsoN, BENCH
AND BAR OF W. VA. 146 (1919).
129 Nineteenth-century West Virginia lawyers never blamed themselves
for delays; always the judges. Said Robert White of Wheeling: "'I do think
that one of the great causes of the law's delay is not so much the bar
(and I speak it, I trust with proper respect) as it is the bench. I remember
far enough back sir, that when questions of law arose before judges of the
olden time, they were disposed of promptly and quickly-a case went on
trial and was finished. But how is it today? You can get in your ordinary
common pleas courts of this State, and most anywhere, so far as I know,
and file a demumer to a declaration, good, bad or indifferent. All you have
to do is to seek to assign some reason for it; and the judge must write it
down, and carry it away with him, and, examine some law books, and he
will take days and weeks before he will decide a simple question." Minutes
of the Meeting, 6 PROC. W. VA. BAR ASSN. 27 (1892).
130 Of course, as White pointed out, this was lamentable: "In my judgment there ought to be some system somewhat as in the past; that when a
judge went upon the bench, he was looked upon as a man of ability and his
opinions were respected and his judgments were respected by the people." Ibid.
'"I Dailey, Recent Legislation and Decisions in West Virginia, 19 PRoc.
W. VA. BAP, ASSN. 93, 100 (1903). In a similar vein was the attitude of the
writer of. the. anonymous pamphlet. As Judge Johnson pointed out:. "This
gentleman [i.e., the writer] has taken particular care to say that they [the
Supreme Court judges] are upright, honorable gentlemen, but they don't
know much." Minutes of the Meeting, 6 PROC. W. VA. BAR ASSN. 78 (1892).
, 32 As Judge Jacobs said in 1899 of the judiciary system which had been
instituted in 1872: "Devised for a people ruled by traditions more than
law, construed by men whose statesmanship was of the rural and plantation
type, it can not be helped to apply it without friction and disappointment
to the business interests of a people which has left its leading strings." Jacobs,
Remodeling the Judiciary, 13 PROc. W. VA. BAR ASSN. 75, 80 (1899).
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state, it had not had time to build traditions;' 3 that it was an itinerant
court in days when travel was neither expeditious nor enjoyable
and boarding houses were the acme of comfort;' 34 that its salaries
were the lowest in the nation' 35 (which was in keeping with its
prestige)

;"'0

that it was understaffed' 37 and undermanned,' 8 almost

3 3

The newness of the court is shown by the fact that in 1900, when
Dent had been on the bench seven years and Brannon even longer, three
of the four original members of the Supreme Court of Appeals were still
alive (Berkshire, Maxwell, and Brown) and two were still actively practising
law. Vandervort, The Supreme Court of West Virginia (Part 1), 12 GREEN
190 (1900).
BAG 187,
' 34 It was characteristic of West Virginia lawyers that when they spoke
of this, it was seldom the hardships suffered by the judges which concerned
them, but rather the inconveniences they, themselves, encountered. One attorney expressed the typical attitude when he complained that the law
dividing the state into three divisions meant that a litigant had but one
opportunity a year for submitting his cause unless he transferred by notice
and followed it out of its "grand division:" 'This boarding house policy
of itinerating the Supreme Court about the State subserves no public good.
It may flatter the vanity of the particular locality where the Court sits, but
it is observed that it does not accelerate the decision of causes-in fact,
rather the contrary." Jacobs, op. cit. supra note 132 at 81.
135 In 1901, a year in which New York paid the Chief Justice of its
Court of Appeals $10,500, the salaries of Brannon and Dent were $2,200.
The Green Bag suggested this was not as bad as it seemed since "the term
of office is twelve years, considerably longer than that in many of the States
which pay larger salaries." Note, Judicial Salaries, 13 GREEN BAG 12 (1901).
The Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform of the State
Bar Association preferred to dwell on the fact that salaries in the five
surrounding states averaged $5,300. Minutes of the Meeting, 18 PROC. W. VA.
24 (1902).
BAR AssN.
' 36 In reply to the charge that the Supreme Court of Appeals had poor
judges because salaries were so low, John Hutchinson of Parkersburg remarked: "It is true, also, that insufficient salaries do not generally command
the services of the best minds; and this is true of all professions and places,
except in the Congress of the United States." Minutes of the Meeting, 6
PROC. W. VA BAR AssN. 42 (1892). This was one issue which found members
of the bar more or less sympathetic with the Court. "Why should a lawyer
who tries a case in court receive $100 a day and a Judge upon the bench,
who by one ruling, can dynamite the legal propositions he submits clear
out of court, receive the magnificent salary of $4.93 and 1 mill per day?"
Campbell, The Proper Method of Nominating Candidates for Judicial Offices and the Salaries to be Paid Judges, 17 PROC. W. V.A. BAR ASSN. 73,
74 (1902).
13 John A. Campbell thought the West Virginia judge was working
under extremely difficult conditions: "Equip him for all this, give him the
facilities to do all this, strike the rock of your public credit, open the doors
of your treasury and give him the means, not only furnish him with a
stenographer, but a secretary, an adjunct learned in the law from whom
he can, upon a mere suggestion as to the lines of inquiry he desires to
pursue, have laid upon his table a written report and brief of the entire
law of the case and likewise the facts if necessary." Ibid.
138 Judge Jacobs said of the four-man court: "[T]he membership of the
Supreme Court is too small for the volume and importance of the business
[T]hey are overworked and have more to do than ought
to be handled ....
reasonably to be required of them. Jacobs, op. cit supra note 132 at 80.
In 1901 it was pointed out that even though the Supreme Court of Appeals
1
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to the point of scandal;"' and that it had to struggle with a chaotic
maze of statutes ' while working with an inadequate library.' 4 '
To share in common such abuse and to labor together under
such circumstances, may have furnished Brannon and Dent with a
mutual bond as they travelled throughout the state. Despite sharp
words, locked conference-door rooms, and sensitive nephews, their
rivalry was intellectual, not personal. They stand as disciples of
opposing West Virginia legal philosophies, not as examples of old
West Virginia's prurience for vendettas. On the whole they worked
together harmoniously; indeed, there seems little doubt that they
derived mutual benefit from their association. On more than one
occasion they joined forces to dissent when their two fellow judges
upheld a lower court's judgment'4 2 and, at times, were generous
was overworked and frequently had to hold special terms, there were proposals to reduce the number of judges from four to three. Higginbotham,
Shall the State Have a New Constitution, 16 PRoc. W. VA. Bsi ASSN. 54, 58
(1901). Nevertheless, the court was increased to five; the additional judge
taking office January, 1905, the term Dent left the bench.
139 "The present number, four, often divides equally and then a calamity
happens. The Constitution gravely provides in such circumstances that the
lower Court shall stand affirmed, but the decision shall be the law of that
case only. . . . At this day the logic by which the convention [of 1872]
reached its conclusion to provide a Court which may, and of late frequently
does, divide equally without providing for a break of the tie and then gravely
nullifies the effect of the decision, is incomprehensible to the bar. It is a
Chinese puzzle. Let us untie the knot by cutting it." Jacobs, op. cit. supra
note 132 at 80-81.
140 In 1887 Senator Willey criticized the "crude and inconsiderate legislation, which so often characterizes our civil and criminal codes---conflictingincapable of interpretation-incomplete, sometimes absurd." He thought a
glance at the state's statutory laws would enable anyone "to appreciate
Shakespeare's weird description of the witches caldron in Macbeth." Willey,
op. cit supra note 70 at 121.
141 Lack of books was an embarassment which the judges did not attempt to hide. In one case, Judge McWhorter wrote: "Defendant cites the
case of Commonwealth v. Gillespie, decided by the court of Quarter Sessions
and reported in 21 Pitts. L.J. 213, which I am unable to find in the library,
from which the defendant's counsel quotes ..
" State v. McBee, 52 W. Va.
257, 262, 43 S.E. 121 (1902). The bar itself, was, often embarassed by
lack of books, a factor which Brannon took into consideration when writing
decisions, as, for example, when he appended a note to an opinion in which
he had cited two English cases: "After the Court had considered the above
opinion, it occurred to me that for use in practice where the English books
are not accessible, it would be better to state a little more fully the holdings
of the two English cases. .. " Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
50 W.42Va. 611, 625, 40 S.E. 591 (1901) (note by Brannon, J.).
' Billingsley v. Clelland, 41 W. Va. 234, 21 S.E. 812 (1895) (English
and Holt for the Court; Brannon joins in Dent's dissent); Town of Davis v.
Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S.E. 906 (1895) (Holt, with whom English joins,
for the Court; Dent and Brannon dissenting). For a case in which Brannon's
majority opinion is supported by Dent and English dissents without comment,
see Stockton v. Morris, 39 W. Va. 432, 19 S.E. 531 (1894).
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in their praise for one another 43 or in their acknowledgment of the
other's help.1 4 4 It may be, however, that the most interesting influence which one had upon his fellow is largely unmeasurablethe effect which Dent's unrestrained approach to opinion writing
had on Brannon's own style. When Dent came on the bench, Brannon was a rather laconic writer.'15 Their different ways of viewing
problems led them to adopt different routes of approach and, consequently, different literary styles. In no case can this better be
appreciated than in Town of Davis v. Davis, in which they both
wrote opinions dissenting from the decision of Judge Homer Holt
which held that a town council had authority to abate as a nuisance
a merry-go-round operated as late as ten o'clock at night and
which, while bringing pleasure to many, kept a few people in its
neighborhood awake. Brannon, laying stress on the reasonableness
of law, the balance between the needs of the few and the pleasures

of the many, and the necessity that police action not appear oppressive in a free society, objected to classifying a carrousel as an
activity "to which the harsh and vigorous remedies provided by
law for public nuisances shall be applied." His judicial style reflects his approach:
"This merry-go-round is not proven a nuisance, and is
not, in its nature, such. It is an amusement from which
children derive great pleasure and enjoyment, and, with
them their parents. A great many most respectable grown
people enjoy their presence in our towns. They want that
element necessary to stamp them as nuisances-that their
harm or annoyance shall be so expensive as to affect the
public at large, not merely a few persons. Many things
43

Brannon: "I consider the exposition of the law given in the opinion
by JUDGE DENT as a correct, able and unanswerable one." Town of
Weston v. Ralston, 48 W. Va. 170, 36 S.E. 446 (1900) (concurring opinion).
144 Dent:
"On this question I include notes made by Judge Brannon,
in which I concur." Billingsley v. Clelland, note 142, supra (dissenting
opinion).
4 5
Exception: When upholding murder convictions Brannon could write
opinions which read like the pulp fiction of the day: "His father was at his
bedside when the wounded young man said, 'Pa, I don't want you to grieve
for me; I am bound to die,' showing the deadly wound. A witness , . .
says he heard a woman's voice outside the door say, 'Lordy, Kenos don't
shoot,' and he replied, 'Damned if I don't' and then the shot." State v.
Douglass, 41 W. Va. 537, 23 S.E. 734 (1895). But then, West Virginia
judges had a special talent for writing murder opinions. Judge McWhorter
showed how highly they had brought the art when he said of one killer:
"He says, 'I killed her because I loved her.' He certainly had a very emphatic
way of expressing his love." State v. Tucker, 52 W. Va. 420, 44 S.E. 427
(1903).
1
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annoy, perhaps hurt, a few persons, but a few must not
make law for the many. A band discoursing music in a
park, very frequently, in summer, no doubt, annoys aged
or sickly persons in the neighborhood, and others tired
of its music, from repetition; and shall we say it is a
nuisance? . . . They must submit to the inconvenience

peculiar to themselves. I do not attempt a discussion at
large. We must not make government too rigid and exacting, upon even the amusements of the people, else it becomes, in their eyes, an engine of oppression and tyranny.
The action of the council in this case, under the form of
law, took away the right of the owner to use his property
to earn a livelihood, and invaded the right of the people
to go to a decent
place for harmless and pleasurable
46
amusements."'
Judge Dent preferred to stress the human factor rather than the
legal, and took as his theme the happy thought that "ordinary
people, who love their own and their neighbor's children, find a
sufficient recompense for all annoyance in their happy enjoyment
of innocent pasttimes and sports, and observe the golden rule, 'As
ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them."'
And his different approach led him to write in a different style
from Brannon's, just as his search for common sense in the law
led him to suggest what he thought were common-sense solutions
to the problems; solutions which Brannon, who continued to stress
the axioms rather than the degrees of law, was not prepared to
offer. Dent agreed with Brannon's bare statement that the law
cannot make things agreeable for every citizens and gave it new
meaning:
"Such a scheme would not be devised by human ingenuity,
for it is always too hot or too cold, too wet or too dry,
too light or too dark, for some people. Always complaining, never satisfied, morbid, phlegmatic, continually annoyed, fault-finding, looking for slights, easily offended,
hysterical, captious, haters of children and their enjoyments, a misery to themselves and a heaviness to their
friends, is their history; and for such the law affords no
remedy, as it can not administer to a mind and heart
146 Town of Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S.E. 906 (1895) (dissenting opinion by Brannon, J.).
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diseased. On the judgment of such it is never safe to
condemn a lawful calling as an offensive annoyance ....
"To testify that a thing is a nuisance does not make it
so, but the witnesses must testify to the annoying characteristics. R. W. Eastman testified "that he goes to bed early
and gets up early; that he sleeps best the first part of the
night; that the noise of the merry-go-round interrupted
[sic] him from sleeping; that his wife had the headache
one night, and it annoyed her from sleeping; that the crowd
around the merry-go-round hallooed and made a noise,
and that the music annoyed him". To go to bed before
9:50 p.m. on a sultry summer night is out of the ordinary
rule, in towns the size of Davis, and this was the hour the
amusement stopped. Neither does ordinary music annoy
the ordinary man, especially when in bed, nor should the
joyous shouts of children at play. So far as his wife was
concerned, she certainly was guilty of contributory negligence in having the headache; and, as to which caused her
to lose sleep, she was the best witness. . Three were annoyed by the music, one by the noise of the crowd, one by the
whistle, which he imagined blew, whether it did or not;
and, being early bed-goers, they were each cheated out of
from half to one hours sleep each night. This is the evidence of nuisance on which the judgement of abatement was
founded, and the defendant deprived of his legitimate
business. If the whistle was an offensive annoyance, the
council could have prevented its blowing. If the music was
an offensive annoyance, the council could have required
the playing of tunes low and soothing, or stopped it altogether. The children's mirth and laughter could have been
suppressed in the same manner, and their shouting could
have been prevented by the promise of a free ride. And,
that these witnesses should enjoy their twilight rest, they
could have caused the 'machine' to abate at early candlelighting, or when the chickens go to roost."' 47
Dent's approach, then, was to emphasize what Edmond Cahn
calls the "law-consumer."' 48 It was an approach which stressed the
147 Ibid. (dissenting opinion by Dent, J.).
148 CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN,

23-32 (1961); Calm,
The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1166 (1959). Dent did not
articulate the theory of consumer-oriented public law as did Cahn, rather
he simply looked at the law from the angle of those to whom it applied.
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viewpoint of the human being, the citizen "buyer" of justice, whom
the law effects and was here characterized by a somewhat philosophical, somewhat cynical balancing of human frailities, individual
misanthropy, and just plain West Virginia cussedness.' 49 This
approach had much to do with his style of writing; a style which
may have been contagious. Although Brannon always remained
constant to his own axiom-directed approach, we find him by
December, 1903, after eleven years of sitting beside Dent, occasionally, when special facts called for it, writing in Dent's looser, freer
style. He ever mastered Dent's favorite judicial paraph-the bit
of quoted verse. Consider this passage from a case in which a will
was contested on grounds of insanity and undue duress:'..
"Remember that the testatrix was a lonely widow, childless, friendless, desolate, her own kindred estranged, bitter
feelings between them, she cherishing resentment against
them, saying in her last solemn act that they had abondoned her, sent her no helping hand. To whom more probably,
more reasonably, than to Stuart, who loved her, visited
her, expressed warm affection for her when others were
cold, and who, as she certifies in her will, befriended and
accomodated her? It is said there was illicit relation between them. It is not proven. Stewart denies it under oath.
But even if there was such relation, what of it? If she was
competent, the law gave her absolute power to will him
all she had. We cannot now try them for illicit intercourse.
They are both now in that city teeming with the countless
millions of all past time, and we have no right to condemn
without proof.
'No farther seek his merits to disclose,
Or draw his frailties from their dread abode,
(There they alike in trembling hope repose)
The bosom of his father and his God.'
References to "that city teeming with countless millions," light
dusting of quidnunces' tidbits, delicate balancing of the odds of
love, and quoting scrapes of verse, all add up to a style seldom
identified with Henry Brannon. But the approach was still his own.
149 For what is one of Dent's best discussions (not otherwise mentioned
in this paper) of the individual or consumer aspect of law, also involving
the right of children to play, see Gibson v. City of Huntington, 38 W. Va.
177, 18
S.E. 447 (1893).
,50 Stewart v. Lyons, 54 W. Va. 665, 673, 47 S.E. 442 (1903).
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He was primarily interested in the legal aspects of the case, not the
human side. He wrote a detailed and sympathetic description of
the personality of the testratix as it bore on the issues of insanity
and duress.' 51 He did not digress onto themes that would have
attracted Dent's wandering pen. Finding that she was neither insane nor coerced, he gave but passing thought to why she would
wish to cut off, without a penny, her own flesh and blood, recounting
merely that she and they were estranged.' 52 This would not have
satisfied Dent, any more than he would have been satisfied to have
made the bare assertion that opponents of merry-go-rounds are
unreasonable, without adding that the world is filled with such
fusspots and cataloguing a few types. So, too, he here might
have wished to stray off from the main question and to have asked
why it is that the ties of kinship are sometimes slender, as shown
by his approach to a somewhat similar case in which he decreed
specific performance of an oral contract made by an old woman
with distant relatives who had agreed to care for her in the last
days. Painting the woman's condition in his own unique style, Dent
rejected the claim of an heir-at-law in an opinion which typified his
concern 53with the human factors which lay behind the doctrines involved.'
No formal biography of Brannon or of Dent has been written
and, consequently, we do not know enough about their lives, ambitions or prejudices to even attempt to suggest a theory explaining
the personal differences between their approaches to the law and
their judicial style. The little that we do know of their backgrounds
is not very helpful. Both were cut from stock formed and nurtured
by the same cultural, ethnic, and educational environment-the safe,
comfortable world of the confident middle class that held the political asendency in the -central Atlantic states during the post-Reconstructive era. Although politically ambitious, Dent was nowhere
near as successful in politics as was Brannon. To explain this by
saying that Brannon was a railroad lawyer while Dent was plaintiff
lawyer, that Brannon remained loyal to the orthodox while Dent
played a rebel role, would be to discuss. effect and not cause, and
would leave still. unanswered- the constitutive question-why were
151 ibid.
52
'
Id. at 668-69.
'53 E.g. Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va. 126, 35 S.E. 848 (1900): "Old
age is naturally repulsive. The hair grows gray, the eyes sunken, the skin
wrinkled and brown, the flesh shrunken, the figure bent, the limbs weak and
trembling, the will feeble, the tongue garulous, the mouth toothless, the
mind wandering, the habits careless and filthy... ."
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their approaches to the solution of legal problems sometimes so
contrary?
Henry Brannon was born the scion of a respected family on
November 26, 1837, in Winchester, Virginia, grew up in the Shenodoah Valley, and was graduated from the University of Virginia
in 1858. Marmaduke Dent was also born in Virginia-in the section
which is now West Virginia-in the hamlet of Granville (later called
Duke) on April 18, 1849. The great grandson of one of the original
settlers of transmontane Virginia he spent his youth in Monogalia
County, and, in 1870, became the first graduate of West Virginia
University. 5 4 After college, Brannon moved to the western mountains, read law in his brother's office, became a member of the Virginia bar in 1859 and, the following year, was elected prosecuting
attorney of Lewis County, a post which always eluded Dent in
heavily-Republican Taylor county. 5 Brannon also served two
terms in the House, of Delegates, another honor which Dent was
denied. In 1880, Brannon was elected judge of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit (succeeding his brother) and went on from there to two
terms on the Supreme Court of Appeals. Dent was permitted only
one term and, after his defeat for reelection, ran for Congress but
was again engulfed in the Republican tide which swept the state
half a century ago. He died a broken, disappointed man on September 11, 1909, having been carried home to Grafton on the midnight
train from Atlantic City where he had gone seeking relief from
Bright's disease.' 56 Brannon was more fortunate. Deciding not to
run for a third term, he returned to his law practice and died, just
after arguing a case in court, on November 24, 1914, two days before
his seventy-seventh birthday. He retained his mental faculties until
the end.' 7
It would be idle to ask which was the more successful and
which was the greater judge. As for success, it would certainly
seem that Brannon has the edge. His first term on the Court was
awarded by a second, a recognition Dent vainly sought, and had
he wished he might have been elected a third time. While the outcome of a political campaign hardly furnishes an adequate guide
154 "Dent . . . was also first president of the University Alumni Association and is the only person to hold the honor of having been elected
president of the association three times." The Morgantown Post, October 27,
1955, p. 10, Col. 1.
155 Dent did, however, serve several years as city attorney of Grafton.
156 The Daily Sentinel, Grafton, W. Va., September 11, 1909, p. 1, Col. 2.
57
1

ATINSON, BENCH AND BAR OF WEsT VimuNaA

64 (1919).
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for measuring the worth of a judge, especially in an age when the
judiciary was caught in the tides of partisian politics, it is the yardstick which Marmaduke Dent probably used. Furthermore, Brannon succeeded in an area in which Dent would have dearly loved
to have left his mark. He published a book on the Fourteenth
Amendment15 which was highly respected"5 9 while the only book
written by Dent was apparently a failure-if it was printed at all."'
As to which was the greater judge, contemporaries again gave the
edge to Brannon, and by a wide margin. Governor Atkinson called
him, "perhaps the greatest jurist that West Virginia has ever brought
forth," '' while praising Dent as an inoffensive man who had made
few enemies. Their obituaries tell the same story. Brannon was
eulogized as the beau ideal of West Virginia judges.'62 The most
said for Dent was that he had led a pure, clean life, 6 ' and had
written opinions more noteworthy for their style than for their substance.' 64
58

1

A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1901). For a decision in which Brannon dealt with the 14th Amendment,
see State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S.E. 283 (1898).
159Atkinson called it "a standard authority upon the questions raised"
(ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 157 at 64) and Knott said it was a book
"which by its depth of thought and scholarly style, is a distinct contribution
to political science" (Knott, Henry Brannon, 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY

603, 604 (1929)).

book had a wonderful title such as one might expect from Dent:
The frequent references
to this book in Dent literature would tend to show that it was published.
It was referred to during his lifetime (in the first directory of West Virginia
University graduates Dent's name appears first and he lists himself as author
of the book), as well as at his death (the Bar Association's biography of
Dent called it a "booklet" entitled True Socialism and said that it "attracted
much attention") and in recent times (The Morgantown Post, October 27,
1955, p. 10, Col. 1). This writer, however, has not only been unable to
locate a copy, but has been unable to find a library which acknowledges
ever having had one.
161 ATKNSON, Op. cit supra note 157 at 64. The official tribute of the
Bar Association, on which Atkinson drew for his biography, was more reserved, referring to him as "one of the greatest lawyers that West Virginia
has ever brought forth." Report of the Committee on Legal Biography, 30
PRoc. W. VA. BAR ASSN. 133 (1915).
162 "He had the wisdom of the historian; the wit of the poet; subtlety
of the mathematician; the logic and rhetoric of the eminent lawyer." Ibid.
Atkinson repeated this remarkable tribute verbatum. ATKINSON, op. cit supra
note 157 at 64.
163 "The ebequies were conducted by Rev. J.A. McClelland, the pastor,
and Rev. J. H. Flanagan, past pastor of the Presbyterian church, both of
whom eulogized the memory and life work of the departed jurist in glowing
terms, setting up his clean, pure life as an example for others to emulate."
The Daily Sentinal, Grafton, W. Va. Monday, September 13, 1909, p. 1, Col. 1.
164The Bar Association's Committee on Legal Biography, which would
reach poetic heights at the bier of Henry Brannon (see supra note 162)
160The

SocIALIsM RESISTLESS, OR HIS KINGDOM COMETH.
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Today, observers might reverse the estimate, for Dent's humanitarian approach to the law would probably strike a more responsive
chord than would Brannon's insistence on precedents and legal logic.
Such a judgment, however, must be made with historical perspective.
To suggest that Dent was a man of justice while Brannon was a man
of law would be unfair to Brannon if offered in the context of today's values. For justice usually seems preferable to mere law after
the crises which gave rise to problems have been forgotten and the
passionate feelings of the moment have faded into the ivory tower
of scholarily debate. Dent was a sometime practitioner of what
Karl Llewellyn calls the Grand Style of common law opinion writing. Brannon was a personification of the Formal Style. 6 ' Llewellyn
believed that the Formal Style reached its fullest flowering in the
United States during the years when Brannon and Dent were sitting
on the Supreme Court of Appeals. It was the accepted manner of
deciding cases and the judge who plied it was regarded as having
mastered the jurist's art. Now, he says, the Grand Style is again
in favor and the Formal Style has passed into limbo along with the
reputations of those who employed it. If this is true, and if the
present judges of West Virginia are students of the Grand Style,
than the influence of Marmaduke Dent could enjoy a new birth while
that of Henry Brannon could go into eclipse and the laurels which
their contemporaries bestowed on Henry Brannon could pass to the
brow of Marmaduke Dent. But if scholars in this era of different
criteria and different fashions were to dismiss Henry Brannon as
merely an honest, intelligent judge of narrow vision, they would
be repeating the mistake committed by his admirers when they
dismissed the passion for justice which fired the unorthodoxy of
Marmaduke Dent. Brannon was a product of his times, and the
solutions which he offered to the challenges of those times was the
main standard by which his contemporaries could judge him. He
could find little to say about Dent as a judge: 'The many decisions written
by him and appearing in volumes 37 to 56, both inclusive,, of the West
Virginia Reports, are strongly expressed, and the majority of them possess
an individuality of style which was marked and forceful. Judge Dent possessed

an unusual memory and a remarkable familiarity with the decided cases in

Virginia and West Virginia. Many of his opinions were enlivened by quota-

tions from the classics and brightened by flashes of native humor, and were
frequently cited and commented upon by legal journals because of these
characteristics as well as precedents for propositions of law." Report of the
Committee
on Legal Biography, 26 PROC. W. VA. BAP ASSN. 177 (1910).
16 5
(1960).

LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5-6
For a suggestion regarding Dent and the Grand Style, see Reid,

Book Review, 7 UTAH L. REv. 563 (1961).
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expounded law in a West Virginia which needed industry and, with
this in mind, stressed the need of protecting corporations which
were opening the mountainous regions for commercial exploitation
and development. Of course, Dent asked him, "Opened for whose
benefit?" While some legal scholars might criticize Brannon for
ignoring this question, or even for not appreciating its implications,
they cannot criticize him for failing to answer it. After all, it is
the question they are still debating.
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